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Abstract
Pay-per-click advertising includes various formats (e.g., search, contextual, so-
cial) with a total investment of more than 200 billion USD per year worldwide.
An advertiser is given a daily budget to allocate over several, even thousands,
campaigns, mainly distinguishing for the ad, target, or channel. Furthermore,
publishers choose the ads to display and how to allocate them employing auc-
tioning mechanisms, in which every day the advertisers set for each campaign
a bid corresponding to the maximum amount of money per click they are will-
ing to pay and the fraction of the daily budget to invest. In this paper, we
study the problem of automating the online joint bid/daily budget optimization
of pay-per-click advertising campaigns over multiple channels. We formulate
our problem as a combinatorial semi-bandit problem, which requires solving a
special case of the Multiple-Choice Knapsack problem every day. Furthermore,
for every campaign, we capture the dependency of the number of clicks on the
bid and daily budget by Gaussian Processes, thus requiring mild assumptions
on the regularity of these functions. We design four algorithms and show that
they suffer from a regret that is upper bounded with high probability as O(
√
T ),
where T is the time horizon of the learning process. We experimentally evaluate
our algorithms with synthetic settings generated from real data from Yahoo!,
IA preliminary version is published in [1]. The novel contributions provided by this
extended version are: a theoretical study of the properties of our algorithms and a more
extensive experimental evaluation.
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and we present the results of the adoption of our algorithms in a real-world
application with a daily average spent of 1,000 Euros for more than one year.
Keywords: Automatic Online Advertising, Combinatorial Bandits, Gaussian
Processes
1. Introduction
Online advertising has been given wide attention by the scientific commu-
nity as well as by industry from more than two decades. In the first half of
2019, in the US, the spent on search advertising alone was more than 28 billion
USD [2], which represents about 50% of the total online advertising market.
The development of techniques to automate the Internet advertising market is
crucial both for the publishers and the advertisers, and artificial intelligence
can play a prominent role in this scenario. In the present paper, we focus on
pay-per-click advertising—including different formats, e.g., search, contextual,
social—in which an advertiser pays only once a user has clicked her ad.
An advertiser is usually given a daily budget to allocate over several, even
thousands, campaigns, distinguishing for the ad (e.g., including text content
and/or images), target (e.g., keyword, geographical area, language, interests),
or channel (e.g., Google, Facebook, Bing). In pay-per-click advertising, to get
an ad impressed, the advertisers take part in an auction carried out by the pub-
lisher or the advertising manager, in which they set a bid and a daily budget
for each campaign [3]. The bid represents the maximum amount of money the
advertisers are willing to pay for a single click, whereas the daily budget is the
maximum spent in a day for a campaign. The advertisers’ goal is to choose the
values of the bid and daily budget for every single campaign to maximize the
revenue subject to a cumulative budget constraint over all the campaigns. This
optimization problem is particularly challenging, as it includes many intricate
subproblems. For instance, the auctioning mechanisms are not truthful, mean-
ing that the best bid for an advertiser may be different from the actual value
per click. As a result, an advertiser needs to resort to learning tools to esti-
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mate the revenue provided by the values of the bid when searching for the best
bidding strategy. More precisely, the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP),
commonly used for search advertising, is well-known not to be truthful even
without budget constraints [4]. Instead, the Vicrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
(VCG), commonly used for contextual and social advertising, is truthful only in
the unrealistic case in which there is no daily budget constraint [5, 6]. 1 Further-
more, every learning algorithm can collect at most a sample per day for every
campaign, thus raising severe data scarcity issues. Besides, the optimization of
the daily budget is a combinatorial problem that needs to be solved every day
in a short time.
1.1. Previous Results on Bid and/or Daily Budget Optimimzation
A few works in the algorithmic economic literature tackle the campaign
advertising problem by combining learning and optimization techniques. The
joint bid/daily budget optimization problem is studied in [7] and [8], where the
authors provide two offline learning approaches. These two works are charac-
terized by models with a huge number of parameters whose estimates require
a considerable amount of data. 2 In [9], the authors separate the optimization
of the bid from that one of the daily budget and use a genetic algorithm to
optimize the budget and subsequently applying some bidding strategies. While
the works in [7, 8, 9] provide no theoretical guarantees, some theoretical results
are known for the convergence of some bidding strategies in a single-campaign
scenario without budget constraints [10].
Online learning approaches with regret guarantees are known only for the re-
stricted cases with a single campaign and a budget constraint over all the length
1 Notably, the value per click is usually unknown at the setup of an advertising campaign,
and its estimation may require a long time. Thus, even without daily budget constraints, an
advertiser could not have enough information to bid truthfully in the VCG mechanism.
2Some of these parameters (e.g., the position of the ad for every display and click) cannot
be observed by advertisers, not allowing the employment of those approaches in practice.
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of the campaign without temporal deadlines. 3 In particular, in [11] and [12],
the authors work on a finite number of bid values and exploit a multi-armed
bandit approach, whereas the approach proposed in [13] deals with a continuous
space of values for the bid and shows that assuring worst-case guarantees leads
to the worsening of the average-case performance.
We also mention some works dealing with daily budget optimization [14, 15,
16, 17], bidding strategies aiming to maximize the profit [18] and the number
of conversions under a budget constraint [19, 20, 21, 22], cost-per-click [23, 24]
and cost-per-action constraints [25]. Finally, some works study the attribution
problem of conversions in display advertising [26, 27].
1.2. Original Contributions
We formulate the joint bid/daily budget optimization problem as a combina-
torial semi bandit problem [28], in which, at every round and for each campaign,
an advertiser chooses a pair of bid/daily budget values and observes some in-
formation on the performance of the campaign. We discretize the bid/daily
budget space, and we formulate the optimization problem as a special case of
the Multiple-Choice Knapsack problem [29], that we solve by dynamic program-
ming in a fashion similar to the approximation scheme for the knapsack problem.
We resort to Gaussian Process (GP) regression models [30] to estimate the un-
certain parameters of the optimization problem (e.g., number of clicks and value
per click), as the adoption of GPs requires mild assumptions on the regularity of
the functions we need to learn and allows one to capture the correlation among
the data thus mitigating the data scarcity issue.
We design four bandit techniques to balance exploration and exploitation in
the learning process, that return either samples or upper confidence bounds of
the stochastic variables estimated by the GPs to use in the optimization prob-
lem. We show that our algorithms suffer from a regret that is upper bounded
3 This last assumption rarely holds in real-world applications where, instead, results are
expected by a given deadline.
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with high probability as O(
√
T ), where T is the learning time horizon.
Finally, we experimentally evaluate the convergence of our algorithms to
the optimal (clairvoyant) solution and its empirical regret as the size of the
problem varies using a realistic simulator based on the Yahoo! Webscope A3
dataset. Furthermore, we present the results of the adoption of our algorithms
in a real-world application over a period longer than one year, with an average
cumulative daily budget of about 1,000 Euros.
1.3. Structure of the Paper
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formulate our problem as
a combinatorial semi bandit. In Section 3, we describe our algorithms, whereas,
in Section 4, we provide their theoretical regret analysis. In Section 5, we present
the experimental evaluation of the algorithms. Section 6 concludes the paper
and provides a discussion on future works. In Appendix A, we report the proofs
of our theoretical results.
2. Problem Formulation
This section is structured as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce the combi-
natorial optimization problem an advertiser needs to tackle every day to find the
best pairs of bid/daily budget values. In Section 2.2, we formulate the learning
problem as a combinatorial semi bandit. In Section 2.3, we describe the main
results related to our problem known in the machine learning literature.
2.1. Optimization Problem Formulation
An advertiser is provided with a collection of N ∈ N advertising campaigns
C = {C1, . . . , CN}, where Cj is the j-th campaign, a finite time horizon of
T ∈ N days, and a spending plan B = {y1, . . . , yT }, where yt ∈ R+ is the
cumulative budget an advertiser is willing to spend at day t ∈ {1, . . . , T} over
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all the campaigns. 45 For every day t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and every campaign Cj , j ∈
{1, . . . , N}, an advertiser chooses a bid/daily budget pair aj,t = (xj,t, yj,t). The
bid xj,t takes values in a finite space X ⊂ R+ and is constrained to be in the
interval [xj,t, xj,t], where xj,t and xj,t ∈ R+ are the minimum and maximum
bid an advertiser can choose, respectively. Similarly, the daily budget yj,t takes
values in a finite and, for simplicity, evenly-spaced set Y ⊂ R+ and is constrained
to be in [y
j,t
, yj,t], where yj,t and yj,t ∈ R+ are the minimum and maximum daily
budget an advertiser can set, respectively. 6 By choosing a specific bid/daily
budget pair (xj,t, yj,t) for a day t on campaign Cj , an advertiser gets an expected
revenue of vj nj(xj,t, yj,t), where vj is the value per click for campaign Cj and
nj(xj,t, yj,t) is the corresponding expected number of clicks. The goal of an
advertiser at every day t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is the choice of the values of the bid and
daily budget for every campaign to maximize the cumulative expected revenue.
These values can be found by solving the following optimization problem.
max
(xj,t,yj,t)∈X×Y
N∑
j=1
vj nj(xj,t, yj,t) (1a)
s.t.
N∑
j=1
yj,t ≤ yt (1b)
xj,t ≤ xj,t ≤ xj,t ∀j (1c)
y
j,t
≤ yj,t ≤ yj,t ∀j (1d)
The objective function stated in Equation (1a) is the weighted sum of the ex-
pected number of clicks nj generated by all the campaigns, where the weights
4 We assume that the set of campaigns C and spending plan B are given. The campaigns
distinguish for the ad, channel, and target. In real-world applications, the set of campaigns
and the spending plan can be optimized from data, e.g., by setting up campaigns with specific
targets and adopting a different cumulative daily budget for every day [31].
5 For the sake of presentation, from now on, we set one day as the unitary temporal step
of our algorithms. The application of our techniques to different time units is straightforward
by opportunely scaling the variables and parameters.
6 The platforms allow different discretization for the bid and the daily budget. For in-
stance, on the Facebook platform, the daily budget discretization has a step of 1.00 Euro,
while, on the Google Adwords platform, a step of 0.01 Euro is allowed.
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vj are the campaigns’ value per click. The constraint in Equation (1b) is a bud-
get constraint, forcing one not to spend more than the cumulative daily budget
limit, while the constraints in Equations (1c) and (1d) force the variables to
assume values the given ranges for bid and daily budget. The above problem is
a special case of the Multiple-Choice Knapsack (MCK) [32], which is a variant
of the knapsack problem where the items are divided into classes and at most
one item per class can be chosen. In the problem above, a class corresponds to
a campaign, whereas an item corresponds to a pair of bid/daily budget values.
Each function nj(x, y) is fully described by |X| |Y | parameters. However,
exploiting the structure of the problem, a much more concise representation
using only 2 |X| parameters can be provided. 7 We factorize the dependency of
the number of clicks on x and y as follows:
nj(x, y) := min
{
nsatj (x), y e
sat
j (x)
}
, (2)
where the functions nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) describe:
• the maximum number of clicks nsatj : X → R+ that can be obtained with a
given bid x without any daily budget constraint (or, equivalently, letting
y → +∞);
• the number of clicks per unit of daily budget esatj : X → R+ with a given
bid x, under the assumption that the number of clicks depends linearly
on the daily budget when nj ≤ nsatj .
The rationale is that the maximum number of clicks nsatj (x) obtainable with bid
x is finite and depends on the number of auctions an advertiser can win when
using bid x. More specifically, nsatj (x) is monotonically increasing in x, since the
number of auctions won by an advertiser and the average quality of the slots
in which the ad is displayed monotonically increase in x. Notably, the cost per
7 The reduction of the number of the parameters from |X| |Y | to 2 |X| does not affect the
complexity of the optimization problem, but it plays a crucial role when one needs to learn
these parameters.
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click monotonically increases in x and, therefore, esatj (x) monotonically reduces
in x. Finally, fixed the value of x, the number of clicks increases linearly in the
daily budget y, where the slope is the number of clicks per unit of daily budget
esatj (x), until the maximum number of clicks n
sat
j (x) obtainable with bid x is
achieved. For the sake of clarity, we report in Figure 1 an example of function
nj for four values of bid; the black dashed curve depicts maxx∈X{nj(x, y)} as
the daily budget y varies.
20 0 20 40 60 80 100
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esat(0.05 ) = 2.0
esat(0.1 ) = 1.18
esat(0.5 ) = 0.59
esat(1.0 ) = 0.38
Figure 1: An example of nj for four values of bid.
2.2. Learning Problem Formulation
In concrete scenarios, the functions nj(·, ·) and the parameters vj in the op-
timization problem stated in Equations (1a)–(1d) are not a priori known, but
they need to be estimated online. Thus, an algorithm needs to gather as much
information as possible about these functions during the operational life of the
system, and, at the same time, not to lose too much revenue in exploring sub-
optimal bid/daily budget allocations (a.k.a. exploration/exploitation dilemma).
Thus, our learning problem can be naturally formulated in a sequential deci-
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sion fashion [33] as a Combinatorial Semi Bandit problem (CSB) [28]. 8 In the
CSB framework, at every round, the learner chooses from a finite set of options,
called arms, a subset of these, called superarm, subject to some combinatorial
constraints (e.g., knapsack constraints). Subsequently, the learner observes the
payoffs of every single arm belonging to the chosen superarm and gets the cor-
responding reward. In the optimization problem stated in Equations (1a)–(1d),
each arm corresponds to a bid/daily budget pair, each superarm corresponds to
a collection of pairs, one per campaign, and the constraints consist in satisfying
the overall daily budget constraint and the range constraints for the bid and
daily budget. The payoff of every arm is the revenue we obtain by setting a
bid/daily budget pair.
We denote with D = X × Y , where |D| = M , the finite space of bid/daily
budget pairs. The learning process proceeds as follows. Every day t, an ad-
vertiser, called learner from hereafter, chooses a superarm S ∈ DN , where
St := (a1,t, . . . ,aN,t) and the arm aj,t ∈ D is the bid/daily budget pair we set
for campaign Cj at day t. Such a superarm St must be feasible according to
the constraints in Equations (1b)-(1d). The choice of superarm St leads to a
revenue expressed in terms of clicks and value per click. We denote the random
variable corresponding to the number of clicks of campaign Cj by Nj(xj,t, yj,t)
and the random valuable corresponding to the value per click of campaign Cj
by Vj . Thus, the revenue is a random variable
∑
j VjNj(xj,t, yj,t). We denote
with rµ(St) the expected value of the revenue when we pull superarm St, and
the vector µ of the expected revenues of each arm of every campaign is:
µ := (v1n1(x1, y1), . . . , v1n1(xM , yM ), . . . , vNnN (x1, y1), . . . , vNnN (xM , yM )).
From now on, we refer to the problem defined above as the Advertisement Bid/
daily Budget Allocation (ABBA) problem.
8 Another approach to solve this problem is to use a multistage method, e.g., backward
induction, but, even for problems with few campaigns and for only 2 stages, such technique
would require a huge computational effort that makes these methods an unfeasible solution
in practice.
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A policy U solving our problem is an algorithm returning, each day t ∈
{1, . . . , T}, a superarm St. Given a policy U, we define the expected pseudo-
regret over a time horizon of T as:
RT (U) := T r∗µ − E
[
T∑
t=1
rµ(St)
]
,
where r∗µ := rµ(S
∗) is the expected value of the revenue provided by the clair-
voyant algorithm choosing the optimal superarm S∗ = (a∗1, . . .a
∗
N}Nj=1 that is
the solution to the problem in Equations (1a)-(1d), and the expectation E[·] is
taken with respect to the stochasticity of the policy U. Our goal is the design
of algorithms minimizing the pseudo-regret RT (U). A recap of the notation
defined in this section and used from now on is provided in Table 1.
2.3. Previous Results on Related Learning Problems
The Combinatorial Bandit framework is introduced in the seminal work [28],
in which the authors also propose an algorithm based on statistical upper con-
fidence bounds, namely CUCB. Under the assumption that the support of the
payoff functions is bounded on [0, 1], the CUCB algorithm provides a regret
O(log(T )). The CUCB does not exploit the potential correlation existing among
the expected reward of the arms, which makes its application to our specific
scenario unfeasible due to the long time needed for learning the parameters.
Another work in the Combinatorial Bandit literature related to our paper is the
one presented in [34], in which the authors design an algorithm for a combi-
natorial semi-bandit problem with knapsack constraints. Differently from our
setting, in this scenario, every single arm is assigned a specific budget that re-
cedes every time the arm is pulled. The process stops as soon as one of the
arms runs out of its budget. Differently, in our setting, we have a cumulative
budget for every day, allowing the pull of the arms for an arbitrary number of
times. In the Combinatorial Bandit literature, few works are known to exploit
arm correlation to speed up the learning process. The most significant result,
provided by Degenne and Perchet [35], describes an algorithm for the specific
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Table 1: Notation
C , set of advertising campaigns
N , number of campaigns
Cj , j-th campaign
t , current day
T , time horizon
B , spending plan
xj,t , set of bid values for the j-th campaign at time t
yj,t , set of the daily budget values for the j-th campaign at
time t
aj,t = (xj,t, yj,t) , set of the bid/daily budget pairs for the j-th campaign
at time t
D , set of the possible bid/daily budget pairs for each cam-
paign
X , space of the possible bid values
Y , space of the possible daily budget values
M , cardinality of D
St , tuple of bid/daily budget pairs (superarms) for the cam-
paigns at time t
vj , value per click of the j-th campaign
nj(xj,t, yj,t) , expected number of clicks given by a bid/daily budget
pair (xj,t, yj,t)
µ , vector of the expected revenues of each arm of every cam-
paign
a∗j , optimal bid/budget pair for the j-th campaign
S∗ , optimal superarm for the set of campaigns C
rµ(St) , expected value of the revenue when we pull superarm St
at round t
r∗µ = rµ(S
∗) , expected value of the revenue when we pull the optimal
superarm St at round t
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case of combinatorial constraints in which we are allowed to pull a fixed number
of arms at each round.
Other works related to ours can be found in the (non-combinatorial) MAB
literature. More precisely, Srinivas et al. [36] propose the GP-UCB algorithm
that employs GPs in the basic stochastic MAB setting where, at every round,
only a single arm can be pulled. The pseudo-regret of the GP-UCB algorithm is
proved to be upper bounded with high probability as O˜(
√
T ). These algorithms
cannot be directly applied to our scenario where, instead, we can pull a superarm
subject to a set of constraints. Notably, we extend the work in [36] to the more
challenging combinatorial setting and show that it has the same upper bound
on the pseudo-regret O˜(
√
T ).
3. Proposed Method
In Section 3.1, we describe our main algorithm. Subsequently, in Sec-
tions 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, we provide the details of the subroutines used by the
main algorithm.
3.1. The Main Algorithm
Algorithm 1, named AdComB, provides the high-level pseudocode of our
method, and its scheme is reported in Figure 2. The input to the algorithm is
composed of: the discrete set of bid values X, the discrete set of daily budget
values Y , a model M(0)j that, for each campaign Cj , captures the prior knowl-
edge of the learner about the function nj(·, ·) and the parameter vj , a spending
plan B, and a time horizon T . We distinguish three phases that are repeated
every day t ∈ {1. . . . , T}.
In the first phase (Lines 4–8), denoted with Estimation in Figure 2, the
algorithm learns, from the observations of days {1, . . . , t − 1}, the model Mj
of every campaign Cj . In particular, the model Mj provides a probability
distribution over the average number of clicks nj(x, y) as the bid x and the
daily budget y vary and over the average value per click vj . The first day the
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Algorithm 1 AdComB
1: Input: set X of bid values, set Y of daily budget values, prior model
{M(0)j }Nj=1, spending plan B, time horizon T
2: for t ∈ {1, . . . , T} do
3: for j ∈ {1, . . . N} do
4: if t = 1 then
5: Mj ←M(0)j
6: else
7: Get (n˜j,t−1, c˜j,t−1, g˜j,t−1, v˜j,t−1)
8: Mj ← Update (Mj , (xˆj,t−1, yˆj,t−1, n˜j,t−1, c˜j,t−1, g˜j,t−1, v˜j,t−1))
9: (nˆj(·, ·), vˆj)← Sampling (Mj , X, Y )
10: {(xˆj,t, yˆj,t)}Nj=1 ← Optimize
({nˆj(·, ·), vˆj , X, Y }Nj=1, yt)
11: Pull (xˆ1,t, yˆ1,t, . . . , xˆN,t, yˆN,t)
Advertising 
Platforms
Optimization
Bandit
Choice
Estimation
Spending
Plan
Figure 2: The information flow in the AdComB algorithm along the three phases.
algorithm is executed, no observation is available, and, thus, the model Mj is
based on the prior M(0)j (Line 5). Conversely, during the subsequent days, for
every campaign Cj , the algorithm gets an observation corresponding to day t−1
(Line 7) composed of:
• (n˜j,t−1) the actual number of clicks;
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• (c˜j,t−1) the actual total daily cost of the campaign;
• (g˜j,t−1) the time when the daily budget yt−1 exhausted at t− 1, if so;
• (v˜j,t−1) the actual value per click;
and, subsequently, updates the model of each campaign Mj using those obser-
vations (Line 8).
In the second phase (Line 9), denoted with Bandit Choice in Figure 2, the
algorithm uses the model Mj just updated to infer an estimate of the function
nj(·, ·), for every value of bid and daily budget in X and Y , respectively, and of
the parameter vj . We denote these estimates with nˆj(·, ·) and vˆj , respectively.
In the third phase (Lines 10–11), denoted with Optimization in Figure 2,
the algorithm employs the estimates nˆj(·, ·) and vˆj in place of nj(·, ·) and vj in
the problem stated in Equations (1a)–(1d). Finally, it solves the optimization
problem returning the bid/daily budget allocation for the next day t (Line 11).
In what follows, we provide a detailed description of the model Mj and of
the subroutines Update(·), Sampling(·), and Optimize(·) used in Algorithm 1.
3.2. Model and Update Subroutine
As mentioned before, the Update subroutine generates an estimate of the
number of clicks nj(·, ·) and value per click vj using the previous observations.
To avoid data scarcity issues and speed up the learning process, we make mild
assumptions on the function nj(·, ·), and we model it by resorting to GPs [30].
These models, developed in the statistical learning field, capture the correlation
of the nearby points in the input space exploiting kernel functions. Moreover,
they provide a probability distribution over the output space—in our case the
number of clicks—for each point of the input space—in our case the discretized
space of bid/daily budget pairs—, thus giving information both on the expected
values of the quantities to estimate and their uncertainty.
For the sake of presentation, we describe how we model the maximum num-
ber of clicks nsatj (·) with a GP regression model. The model directly applies
to the number of clicks per unit of daily budget esatj (·). Furthermore, in some
14
situations, the factorization introduced in Equation (2) may not be exploited
by a learning algorithm, as we discuss below. In these cases, one can adopt a 2-
dimensional GP to model nj(·, ·). The treatment of this case, called unfactorized
hereafter, is analogous to that of nsatj (·), but, every time the factorized model
can be employed, its use is preferable due to the curse of dimensionality [37]. In
the following, we use AdComb-F to refer to the algorithm when the factorized
model is used, while we use AdComb-U for the case in which we do not use the
factorized model.
We model nsatj (·) for campaign Cj with a GP over the bid space X, i.e.,
using a collection of random variables having a joint Gaussian distribution.
Following the definition provided in [30], a GP is completely specified by the
mean m : X → R and covariance k : X × X → [0, 1] functions. Hence, we
denote the GP that models the maximum number of clicks in Cj as follows:
nsatj (x) := GP (m(x), k(x, ·)) ,∀x ∈ X.
More specifically, the correlation structure we use is given by a squared expo-
nential kernel:
k(x, x′) = exp
{
− (x− x
′)2
2 l2
}
∀x, x′ ∈ X,
where l ∈ R+ is a length-scale parameter determining the smoothness of the
function. 9 Other common choices for the kernel can be found in [36].
According to GP model, at every day t, the predictive distribution corre-
sponding to the maximum number of clicks nsatj,t(x) on campaign Cj for the bid
x is estimated by N (µˆj,t−1(x), σˆ2j,t−1(x)) with:
µˆj,t−1(x) = m(x) + k(x, xˆj,t−1)>Φ−1
(
n˜satj,t−1 −mj,t−1
)
,
9If available, a priori information on the process can be employed to design a function
m(x) over the input space X which specifies the mean value. For instance, when informa-
tion on the maximum number θ of clicks achievable for any bid is available, one may use a
linearly increasing function over the bid space as m(x) = xθ
maxx′∈X x′
. If instead no a priori
information is available, one can use a uninformative prior mean by setting m(x) = 0,∀x ∈ X.
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σˆ2j,t−1(x) = k(x, x)− k(x, xˆj,t−1)> Φ−1 k(x, xˆj,t−1),
where xˆj,t−1 := (xˆj,1, . . . , xˆj,t−1)
>
is the vector of the bid set so far, k(x, xˆj,t−1) :=
(k(x, xˆj,1), . . . , k(x, xˆj,t−1))> is the correlation value for the bid x w.r.t. each el-
ement of the vector xˆj,t−1, mj,t−1 := (m(xˆj,1), . . . ,m(xˆj,t−1))
>
is the vector of
the prior for the input in xˆj,t−1, n˜satj,t−1 :=
(
n˜satj,1, . . . , n˜
sat
j,t−1
)>
is the vector of
maximum number of clicks achieved the previous days, [Φ]h,k := k(xˆj,h, xˆj,k)+λ
is the Gram matrix built on the available data, and λ is the variance of the real-
izations we use in the estimation process. 1011 Note that the distribution of the
maximum number of clicks at the first day is N (m(x), k(x, x)) for each x ∈ X
since no information from the data can be used yet.
The parameter n˜satj,t is set equal to the observation c˜j,t when the daily budget
yˆj,t used for campaign Cj did not exhaust. When instead yˆj,t exhausted, we
have not a direct observation of n˜satj,t , and, thus, we set n˜
sat
j,t as a function of the
time g˜j,t. For instance, if we assume a uniform distribution of the clicks over
the day, the value of n˜satj,t has the following expression:
n˜satj,t :=
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g˜j,t
n˜j,t,
where g˜j,t ∈ (0, 24] is expressed in hours. In general, this relationship can be esti-
mated from historical data coming from past advertising campaigns of products
belonging to the same category (e.g., toys, insurances, beauty products). Con-
versely, if no information on how the clicks distribute over the day is available,
one has to rely on the unfactorized model for nj(·, ·). Similar considerations
hold for the estimation of the value per click vj .
We estimate vj , at day t, from the observations v˜j,t−1 := (v˜j,1, . . . , v˜j,t−1)> of
the previous days up to t−1. We use a single Gaussian probability distribution to
model the value per click vj , thus, at every day t, given the observations v˜j,t−1,
10 From now on, we denote with N (µ, σ2) the Gaussian with mean µ and variance σ2.
11 The computation cost of the estimation can be dramatically reduced by using an alter-
native, but much more involved, approach whereby the inverse of the Gram matrix Φ−1 is
stored and updated iteratively at each day; see [30] for details.
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we estimate its mean νˆj,t and variance ψˆ
2
j,t relying on the Bayesian update of a
prior N (0, ψ2j ) [38], as follows:
νˆj,t−1 :=
ψ2j
∑t−1
h=1 v˜j,h
ξ + (t− 1)ψ2j
,
ψˆ2j,t−1 :=
ψ2j ξ
ξ + (t− 1)ψ2j
,
where ξ is the measurement noise variance. To summarize, the data needed for
updating the model Mj corresponding to campaign Cj at day t consists of the
following elements:
• the values per click v˜j,t−1,
• the chosen bids xˆj,t−1,
• the maximum number of achievable clicks n˜satj,t−1,
• the number of clicks per unit of daily budget e˜satj,t−1 :=
(
n˜j,1
c˜j,1
, . . . ,
n˜j,t−1
c˜j,t−1
)>
.
3.3. Sampling Subroutine
The Sampling subroutine aims at returning an estimate of the expected num-
ber of clicks and the value per click to use in the optimization problem stated
in Equations (1a)–(1d). The na¨ive choice of using the expected value computed
fromMj may not provide any guarantee to minimize the regret RT (U), as it is
well known in the bandit literature. To guarantee that our algorithm minimizes
the cumulative expected regret, we compute an estimation exploiting the infor-
mation on the uncertainty provided by model Mj . More precisely, the model
Mj associated with campaign Cj provides a probability distribution over the
values of the function nj(·, ·) and the values vj can assume. This is equivalent
to say that Mj provides a probability distribution over the possible instances
of the optimization problem in Equations (1a)–(1d). The Sampling subroutine
generates, from Mj , a single instance of the optimization problem, assigning a
value to nj(x, y) for every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and vj .
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We propose two different approaches for the sampling phase, namely AdComB-
UCB and AdComB-TS, taking inspiration from the GPUCB algorithm [36], and
the Thompson Sampling (TS) algorithm [39], respectively. 12
The AdComB-UCB algorithm uses upper confidence bounds on the expected
value of the posterior distributions to estimate nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x). More specif-
ically, nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) are replaced in the optimization problem defined in
Equation (1a)–(1d) by:
u
(n)
j,t−1(x) := µˆj,t−1(x) +
√
b
(n)
j,t−1 σˆj,t−1(x),
u
(e)
j,t−1(x) := ηˆj,t−1(x) +
√
b
(e)
j,t−1 sˆj,t−1(x),
respectively, where ηˆj,t−1(x) and sˆ2j,t−1(x) are the mean and the variance pro-
vided by the GP modeling esatj (·), respectively, b(n)j,t−1 ∈ R+ and b(e)j,t−1 ∈ R+ are
non-negative sequences of values, which will be discussed later on in Section 4.
Properly setting the values of b
(n)
i,t−1 and b
(e)
i,t−1 leads us to design optimistic
bounds, that are necessary for the convergence of the algorithm to the optimal
solution. Similarly, for the value per click vj , we use:
u
(v)
j,t−1 := νˆj,t−1 +
√
b
(v)
j,t−1 ψˆj,t−1,
where b
(v)
j,t−1 ∈ R+ is a non-negative sequence of values.
Conversely, the AdComB-TS algorithm draws samples from the distributions
corresponding to nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) and, consequently, computes the value of
nj(x, y) to be used in the following optimization phase. More formally, at a
given day t and for every bid in x ∈ X, we replace nsatj (x) and esatj (x) in the
optimization problem defined in Equation (1a)–(1d) with:
θ
(n)
j,t−1(x) ∼ N (µˆj,t−1(x), σˆ2j,t−1(x)),
θ
(e)
j,t−1(x) ∼ N (ηˆj,t−1(x), sˆ2j,t−1(x)),
respectively. Similarly, for the value per click, we draw a sample θ
(v)
j,t−1(x) as
12 For the sake of clarity, in what follows we describe the our sampling procedure for the
AdComb-F version of AdComb; the case for the unfactored model AdComb-U is analogous.
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follows:
θ
(v)
j,t−1 ∼ N (νˆj,t−1, ψˆ2j,t−1).
Finally, given the values for nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) generated by one of the two
aforementioned methods, we compute nj(x, y) as prescribed by Equation (2)
for each bid x ∈ X and for each daily budget y ∈ Y , and use them in the
following optimization procedure.
3.4. Optimize Subroutine
Finally, for every campaign Cj , we need to choose the best bid/daily budget
pair to set at day t. We resort to a modified version of the algorithm in [32] used
for the solution of the knapsack problem. Let us define the set of the feasible bid
and daily budgets for the round t and the campaign Cj as Xj,t := X ∩ [xj,t, xj,t]
and Yj,t := Y ∩ [yj,t, yj,t], respectively. At first, for every value of daily budget
y ∈ Yj,t, we define zj(y) ∈ Xj,t as the bid maximizing the number of clicks,
formally:
zj(y) := arg max
x∈Xj,t
nj(x, y).
The value zj(y) is easily found by enumeration. Then, for each value of daily
budget y ∈ Y , we define wj(y) as the value we expect to receive by setting the
daily budget of campaign Cj equal to y and the bid equal to zj(y), formally:
wj(y) :=
 vj nj(zj(y), y) yj,t ≤ y ≤ yj,t0 y < y
j,t
∨ y > yj,t
.
This allows one to remove the dependency of the optimization problem defined
in Equations (1a)–(1d) from x, letting variables y the only variables to deal
with.
Finally, the optimization problem is solved in a dynamic programming fash-
ion. We use a matrix M(j, y) with j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and y ∈ Y . We fill iteratively
the matrix as follows. Each row is initialized as M(j, y) = 0 for every j and
y ∈ Y . For j = 1, we set M(1, y) = w1(y) for every y ∈ Y , corresponding to the
best budget assignment for every value of y if the campaign Cj were the only
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campaign in the problem. For j > 1, we set for every y ∈ Y :
M(j, y) = max
y′∈Y,y′≤y
{
M(j − 1, y′) + wj(y − y′)
}
.
That is, the value in each cell M(j, y) is found by scanning all the elements
M(j − 1, y′) for y′ ≤ y, taking the corresponding value, adding the value given
by assigning a budget of y−y′ to campaign Cj and, finally, taking the maximum
among all these combinations. At the end of the iterative process, the optimal
value of the optimization problem can be found in the cell corresponding to
maxy∈Y M(N, y). To find the optimal assignment of daily budget, it is sufficient
to store the partial best assignments of budget in the cells of the matrix.
The complexity of the aforementioned algorithm is O(NH2), i.e., it is linear
in the number of campaigns N and quadratic in the number of different values
of the budget H := |Y |, where | · | is the cardinality of a set. When H is huge,
the above algorithm may require a long time. In that case, it is sufficient to
reduce H by rounding the values of the budget as in the FPTAS of the knapsack
problem.
4. Regret Analysis
We provide a theoretical finite-time analysis of the regret RT (U) of the
algorithms proposed in the previous section. The derivation of the guarantees
of our algorithm exploits the results presented in [40].
Initially, we define the Maximum Information Gain, which we use to bound
the regret of the AdComb algorithm. Let us start defining the Information Gain
of a set of samples drawn from a GP according to [36] as follows:
Definition 1 (Information Gain). Given a realization of a GP f(·) and a vector
of noisy observations y(x) = (y(x1), . . . , y(xt))
> over the input points x =
(x1, . . . , xt)
> for the function f(·), the Information Gain of the set of samples
(x,y(x)) is defined as:
IG(y(x) | f) := 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣I + Φλ
∣∣∣∣ ,
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where I is the identity matrix of order t, λ is the noise variance of the realiza-
tions and [Φ]ij := k(xi, xj) is the Gram matrix of the vector computed on the
inputs x.
Using the previous definition, we define the Maximum Information Gain, as
follows.
Definition 2 (Maximum Information Gain). Given a realization of a GP f(·),
the Maximum Information Gain of a generic set of t noisy observations y(x)
from the function f(·) is defined as:
γt(f) := max
x∈Xt
IG(y(x) | f),
where X is the input space.
For the sake of presentation, we report our regret analysis separately for the
case in which the model of nj(·, ·) is unfactorized (Section 4.1) and the case in
which it is factorized (Section 4.2).
4.1. Unfactorized Model
We show that the worst-case pseudo-regret of the AdComb algorithm when
using the unfactorized model is upper bounded as follows.
Theorem 1. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nj(x, y) is the realization of a GP. Using the AdComb-U-UCB algorithm
with the following upper bounds for the number of clicks and of value per click:
uˆ
(n)
j,t−1(x, y) := µˆj,t−1(x, y) +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(x, y),
uˆ
(v)
j,t−1 := νˆj,t−1 +
√
b′t ψˆ
2
j,t−1,
respectively, with bt := 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
3δ
)
and b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
3δ
)
. For every
δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
√√√√√8TNbT
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
) N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + ξ(nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
),
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where, λ and ξ are variances of the measurement noise of the click functions
nj(·) and of the value per click vj, respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the
maximum expected value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is
the maximum expected number of click we might obtain on average over all the
campaigns Cj, and σ
2 := k(a,a) ≥ σˆ2j,t(a) for each j, t and a. Equivalently,
with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
 ,
where the notation O˜(·) disregards the logarithmic factors.
Theorem 2. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nj(x, y) is the realization of a GP. Using the AdComb-U-TS algorithm, for
every δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
{
8TN
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
)bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
+ξb′T (nmax +
√
bTσ)
2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where bt := 8 log
(
2NMt2
3δ
)
, b′t := 8 log
(
2Nt2
3δ
)
, λ and ξ are variances of the
measurement noise of the click functions nj(·) and of the value per click vj,
respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected value per click,
nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is the maximum expected number of click
we might obtain on average over all the campaigns Cj, and σ
2 := k(a,a) ≥
σˆ2j,t(a) for each j, t and a.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
 .
4.2. Factorized Model
We show that the worst-case pseudo-regret of the AdComb algorithm when
using the factorized model is upper bounded as follows.
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Theorem 3. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) are the realization of GPs. Using the AdComb-F-UCB
algorithm with the following upper bounds for the number of clicks, the number
of clicks per unit of budget, and the value per click, respectively:
u
(n)
j,t−1(x) := µˆj,t−1(x) +
√
btσˆj,t−1(x),
u
(e)
j,t−1(x) := ηˆj,t−1(x) +
√
btsˆj,t−1(x),
u
(v)
j,t−1 := ˆνj,t−1 +
√
b′tψˆj,t−1,
with bt = 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
2δ
)
and b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
2δ
)
. For every δ ∈ (0, 1), the
following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
{
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where c¯1 :=
12v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
12v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
, and c¯3 := 12ξ, ξ, λ and λ
′ are the
variance of the value per click, measurement noise on the maximum number
of clicks and number of clicks per unit of daily budget, respectively, vmax :=
maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y)
is the maximum expected number of click we might obtain on average over all
the campaigns Cj, ymax := maxy∈Y y is the maximum budget one can allocate
on a campaign, and σ2 := k(x, x) ≥ σˆ2j,t(x), s2 := k′(x, x) ≥ sˆ2j,t(x) for each j,
t and x.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
[γT (nj) + γT (ej)]
 .
Theorem 4. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) are the realization of GPs. Using the AdComb-F-TS
algorithm, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
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RT (U) ≤
{
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where bt = 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
2δ
)
, b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
2δ
)
, c¯1 :=
48v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
48v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
,
and c¯3 := 12ξ, ξ, λ and λ
′ are the variance of the value per click, measure-
ment noise on the maximum number of clicks and number of clicks per unit of
daily budget, respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected
value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is the maximum ex-
pected number of click we might obtain on average over all the campaigns Cj,
ymax := maxy∈Y y is the maximum budget one can allocate on a campaign, and
σ2 := k(x, x) ≥ σˆ2j,t(x), s2 := k′(x, x) ≥ sˆ2j,t(x) for each j, t and x.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
[γT (nj) + γT (ej)]
 .
The upper bounds provided by Theorems 1–4 are expressed in terms of the
maximum information gain γT (·) one might obtain selecting T samples from the
GPs defined in Section 3.2. The problem of bounding γT (f) for a generic GP
f has been already addressed by [36], where the authors present the bounds for
the squared exponential kernel γT (f) = O((log T )
d+1), where d is the dimension
of the input space of the GP (d = 2 for AdComb-U, and d = 1 for AdComb-F).
Notice that, thanks to the previous result our AdComb algorithm suffers from
a sublinear pseudo-regret since the terms γT (nj) and γT (ej) are bounded by
O((log T )d+1), and the bound in Theorems 1–4 is then O(N
√
T (log T )d+1)).
5. Experimental Evaluation
This section is structured as follows. In Section 5.1, we experimentally eval-
uate the convergence to the optimal solution and the empirical regrets of our
algorithms in synthetic settings. In Section 5.2, we present the results of the
adoption of our algorithms in a real-world setting.
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5.1. Evaluation in the Synthetic Setting
We evaluate our algorithms in synthetic settings generated as follows. In
every setting, there is a single advertiser optimizing a set of N campaigns by our
algorithms, and, for every campaign Cj , there are other δj−1 advertisers whose
behavior is, instead, stochastic. At day t, every campaign Cj can be involved
in a set AUj,t of auctions, whose number |AUj,t| is drawn from a Gaussian
probability distribution N (µ(s)j , (σ(s)j )2) with mean µ(s)j and standard deviation
σ
(s)
j and subsequently rounded to the nearest integer. We denote, for campaign
Cj , the click and conversion probabilities of the advertiser using our algorithms
with p
(cl)
j and p
(co)
j , respectively. These probabilities are the same for all the
auctions in which Cj is involved. We assign a tuple of parameters µ
(b), (σ(b))2
to every other advertiser before the beginning of the experiment, and, at every
auction, the bids bh are drawn from a Gaussian distribution N (µ(b), (σ(b))2),
being µ(b) and σ(b) the mean and standard deviation parameters of the bid
distribution, respectively. Similarly, the click probabilities ρh are uniformly
sampled in the interval [0, 1] at every auction.
The auction mechanism we use is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves [41] and the
number of available slots is γj , with γj ≤ δj . Once the optimal allocation is
found, we simulate a user who may or may not click the ad, and generate a click
and/or a conversion according to probabilities p
(cl)
j and p
(co)
j , respectively. After
the click, the daily budget of the advertiser using our algorithms is reduced as
prescribed by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
5.1.1. Experiment #1
This experiment aims at showing that the algorithms, which do not suf-
ficiently explore the space of the arms, may not converge to the (clairvoyant)
optimal solution. We use a setting with N = 4 different campaigns. The param-
eters describing the setting are provided in Table 2. Furthermore, in Figure 3, we
report, for each campaign Cj , the best instantaneous revenue vj maxx nj(x, y)
as the daily budget allocated to the single campaign varies (this is done maxi-
mizing the performance over the feasible bid values x ∈ X). The peculiarity of
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Table 2: Parameters of the synthetic settings.
C1 C2 C3 C4
µj 1000 1500 1500 1250
σj 50 50 50 50
γj 5 5 5 5
δj 7 7 7 7
µ(b) 0.5 0.33 0.4 0.39
σ(b) 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.51
p(obs)(1) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
p(obs)(2) 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8
p(obs)(3) 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6
p(obs)(4) 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5
p(obs)(5) 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3
p
(cl)
j 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
p
(co)
j 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
this setting is the similarity of the performance of campaigns C1 and C4. Indeed,
this similarity makes the identification of the optimal solution hard. We set the
following limits for every t ≤ T where T = 200 days and for every campaign
Cj : cumulative budget yt = 500, minimum and maximum bid values xj,t = 0,
and xj,t = 2, respectively, minimum and maximum daily budget values yj,t = 0,
yj,t = 500, respectively. Furthermore, we use an evenly spaced discretization
of |X| = 10 bids and |Y | = 10 budgets over the aforementioned intervals. We
assume a uniform distribution of the clicks and conversions over the day (see
Section 3).
We compare the experimental results of our algorithms (AdComb-U-UCB,
AdComb-U-TS AdComb-F-UCB, and AdComb-F-TS) to identify the modeling
and/or exploration strategies providing the best performance. 13 Furthermore,
we introduce a baseline represented by the algorithm AdComb-F-MEAN, which
13Notice that a straightforward extension of the algorithm proposed in [28], i.e., designing
a version accounting for Gaussian distribution, would require 100 days to have a single sample
for each different bid/daily budget pair. Indeed, it would purely explore the space of arms
without any form of exploitation for t ≤ 100. Therefore, we omit the comparison that would
not provide any meaningful insight to the problem.
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is a “pure exploration” version of AdComb-F such that, at every round t, the
posterior expected value of the number of clicks for each bid/daily budget pair
is given in input to the optimization procedure. In the GPs used by all the
algorithms, we adopt a squared exponential kernel, whose hyper-parameters are
chosen as prescribed by the GP literature, see [30] for details, and we started
from an uninformative zero-mean prior.
In this experiment, in addition to the cumulative pseudo-regret Rt(U), we
also evaluate the expected value of the revenue rµ(St). Obviously, in the case
of the cumulative pseudo-regret, the performance improves as the cumulative
pseudo-regret reduces, and, conversely, in the case of the revenue, the perfor-
mance improves as it increases. The experimental results are averaged over 100
independent executions of the algorithms.
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Figure 3: Expected value of vj maxx nj(x, y) used in Experiment #1 for each campaign and
for each value of the daily budget. Violet dots corresponds to the expected value of the number
of conversions associated to the optimal daily budget allocation.
In Figure 4a, we report the average instantaneous reward rµ(St) of our al-
gorithms, while, in Figure 4b, we report their average cumulative pseudo-regret
Rt(U). The reward provided by all the algorithms but AdComb-F-MEAN con-
verges to the optimal reward provided by a clairvoyant algorithm and presents
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Figure 4: Results for Experiment #1: revenue (a), and cumulative pseudo-regret (b). The
black horizontal line in (a) is the optimal reward of the clairvoyant algorithm r∗µ. The shaded
regions in (b) represent the 95% confidence intervals of the mean.
a slightly varying reward even at the end of the time horizon due the variance
of the GP used to choose the daily budget allocation over time. This vari-
ance is larger at the beginning of the process, thus incentivising exploration,
and it decreases as the number of observations increases, allowing the algo-
rithms to reach the (clairvoyant) optimal reward asymptotically. Although all
our algorithms converge to the (clairvoyant) optimal solution, the AdComb-F-
TS algorithm provides the smallest cumulative pseudo-regret for every t ≥ 30.
AdComb-F-UCB has performance slightly worse than that of AdComb-F-TS. The
AdComb-F-MEAN algorithm provides the best performance for t ≤ 30, but it
is not capable to achieve the (clairvoyant) optimal solution. As a result, for
larger values of t, the performance of AdComb-F-MEAN decreases achieving, at
t = 200, a regret significantly larger than that one provided by AdComb-F-TS.
This is because AdComb-F-MEAN does not explore the arms space properly and,
as a consequence, in some of the 100 independent runs, it gets stuck in a sub-
optimal solution of the optimization problem. Conversely, AdComb-F-TS and
AdComb-F-UCB, thanks to their exploration incentives, converge to the optimal
solution asymptotically in all the runs. We have a similar behavior of the al-
gorithms is a situation in which the performance of the algorithms are rather
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different and the observations are very noisy. Finally, we observe that AdComb-
U-UCB and AdComb-U-TS suffer from a much larger regret than that one of
their factorized counterparts—more than 100% at t = 200—and this is mainly
accumulated over the first half of the time horizon.
In real-world settings, it may be usual dealing with scenarios in which multi-
ple campaigns have similar performance, or they have different performance and
the observations are very noisy. In those situations, AdComb-F-MEAN might get
stuck in a suboptimal solution, thus providing a small expected revenue w.r.t. a
clairvoyant algorithm. Conversely, both the unfactorized and the factorized ver-
sions of our algorithms might still be a viable solution since they have proven
to converge to the optimum asymptotically. For this reason, we do not recom-
mend the adoption of the AdComb-F-MEAN algorithm in practice and we omit
its evaluation in the following experimental activities.
5.1.2. Experiment #2
This experiment aims at evaluating how the size of the discretization of the
bid space (in terms of |X|) and daily budget space (in terms of |Y |) used in our
algorithms affect their performance. Indeed, if, on the one hand, an increase in
the number of the available bid/daily budget pairs corresponds to an increase
of the expected revenue of the clairvoyant solution, on the other hand, a larger
arms space results in larger exploration costs. We investigate how the impact
on the exploration cost is mitigated by the correlation between arms that allows
one to gain information over all the arms space once one arm is pulled.
In this experiment, we adopt the same setting used in Experiment #1 (see
Table 2) with different granularities of discretization in the bid space X or daily
budget space Y . In particular, we study two settings over a time horizon of
T = 50 rounds. In the first setting, the number of values of the bid space
is |X| ∈ {5, 10, 20, 40, 80}, while the number of daily budget values is |Y | =
10. In the second setting, the number of values of the daily budget space
is |Y | ∈ {5, 10, 20, 40, 80}, while the number of bid values is |X| = 10. These
discretizations are such that every space with a larger number of values includes
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the space with a smaller number of values. For instance, a set with 40 values
strictly includes the one with 20 values.
We compare AdComb-U-TS and AdComb-F-TS in terms of both cumulative
expected revenue (over time) PT (U) :=
∑T
t=1 rµ(St) and the following perfor-
mance index:
V (X,Y ) =
PT (U)
T r∗µ
,
where both the algorithms selecting St and the clairvoyant algorithm selecting
S∗ (corresponding to r∗µ) are run on the space X × Y . 14 Basically, V (X,Y ) ∈
[0, 1] is a ratio returning, given a space of arms X×Y , the efficiency of a learning
algorithm with respect to the optimal solution achievable with that arm space.
The normalization with respect to the optimal solution achievable with a given
arm space mitigates the fact that, enlarging the arms space, the optimal revenue
may increase.
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Figure 5: Results for Experiment #2: performance of the AdComb-F-TS and AdComb-U-TS
algorithms as |X| varies: (a) cumulative expected revenue, (b) V (X,Y ) index.
In Figure 5a, we show the value of PT (U) for our algorithms and of the
optimal solution (denoted with Opt) as the bid space granularity |X| varies. It
14 The results for AdComb-U-UCB and AdComb-F-UCB are omitted since they are in line
with the ones we present and do not provide any further insight.
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Figure 6: Results for Experiment #2: performance of the AdComb-F-TS and AdComb-U-TS
algorithms as |Y | varies: (a) cumulative expected revenue, (b) V (X,Y ) index.
is worth noting that the increase in the clairvoyant optimal reward for |X| ≥ 10
is negligible. The cumulative revenue provided by the AdComb-F-TS algorithm
is decreasing for |X| > 40. However, the loss w.r.t. the revenue gained when
|X| = 80 is about 3%. The AdComb-U-TS algorithm has a similar behavior.
This result shows that the cost due to the exploration of a larger space of arms
is larger than the increase of the optimal achievable reward, and it suggests, in
practice, the adoption of a discretization of the bid space with about |X| = 40
evenly-spaced values. In Figure 5b, we show the values of V (X,Y ) achieved
by the AdComb-U-TS and AdComb-F-TS algorithms. In this case, for both
algorithms, the value of V (X,Y ) decreases as |X| increases. This is because the
algorithms pays a larger exploration cost. However, the empirical increase in
inefficiency is only logarithmic in |X|. This result shows that the performance
of the algorithms is robust to an increase of the number of possible bids.
In Figure 6a, we show the value PT (U) of our algorithms and of the optimal
solution as |Y | varies. The results are similar to those obtained above when
|X| varies. The only peculiarity, in this case, concerns the performance of the
AdComb-F-TS algorithm. Despite the theoretical analysis provides a logarithmic
dependency of the regret from |Y |, the empirical results seem to suggest that
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the values of V (X,Y ) are approximately constant as |Y | varies. This empirical
result does not hold for the AdComb-U-TS algorithm, whose performance are
significantly affected by the number of daily budget intervals. Intuitively, this
is because, in the factorized model, the daily budget is not an input to the GPs
we use, thus, it does not affect the exploration of the algorithm. Conversely,
in AdComb-U-TS, the daily budget values constitute a part of the input to the
GPs, and, therefore, an increase of the number of the daily budget values results
in a larger regret since the algorithm needs to explore a wider space of arms.
In conclusion, the use of a more fine-grained bid/daily budget space to ex-
plore provides less revenue overall, but with a mild decrease in terms of perfor-
mance, allowing, in practical cases, to use a large discretization space.
5.1.3. Experiment #3
This experiment aims at evaluating the performance of our algorithms with
random realistic settings generated by exploiting Yahoo! Webscope A3 dataset.
More specifically, we consider N = 4 campaigns whose parameters µj , σj , γj , δj
are those reported in Table 2. The values of the parameters µ(b), σ(b), p(obs)(δ),
p
(cl)
j are, instead, generated according to distributions estimated from the auc-
tions of the Yahoo! Webscope A3 dataset. We set a constant cumulative daily
budget yt = 100 over a time horizon of T = 100 days, with limits yj,t = 0,
yj,t = 100, xj,t = 0, and xj,t = 1 for every t ≤ T,Cj . Furthermore, we use
an evenly spaced discretization of |X| = 10 values of bid and |Y | = 10 values
of daily budget. We generate 10 different scenarios, for each of them, we run
100 independent experiments over the same scenarios and averaged over them.
Given a setting and an algorithm, we denote with β the percentage of runs
in which the given algorithm has the best performance in terms of cumulative
reward in the given setting.
In Table 3, we report, for every algorithm and every setting, the average
cumulative regret RT , its standard deviation σRT , and β. In almost all the
settings, the best algorithm is AdComb-F-TS. Furthermore, AdComb-F-TS out-
performs the other algorithms in more than the 70% of the runs in all settings.
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However, it is worth to note that in settings 1 − 5 − 6, for t ≤ 25, AdComb-
F-UCB outperforms the other algorithms in more than 11%, 73%, 7% of the
cases, respectively. This provides evidence that only in some specific scenar-
ios AdComb-F-UCB provides a viable solution to the ads optimization problem.
Conversely, AdComb-U-TS and AdComb-U-UCB achieve lower performance than
AdComb-F-TS and AdComb-F-UCB algorithms in all runs. For this reason, in
the real-world setting, we adopt the AdComb-F-TS algorithm.
5.2. Evaluation in a Real-world Setting
We adopted the AdComB-F-TS algorithm to advertise in Italy a set of cam-
paigns for a loan product of a large international company. The goal was the
maximization of the number of the leads. Due to reasons of industrial secrecy,
we cannot disclose the name of the product and the name of the company. The
campaigns started July 1st 2017 and were active up to December 31st 2019.
In our discussion, we report the results corresponding to the first 365 days of
the experiment, grouped by weeks as the behavior of the users can be slightly
different during the days of a single week and some campaigns were active only
some specific days of the week. During these 365 days, the set of campaigns
changed over time, some being added, others being discarded or changed, due
to business needs such as, e.g., the creation of new graphical logos, messages, or
new user profiles to target. In particular, the total number of campaigns used
is 29, while, initially, the campaigns were 8. The activation/deactivation of the
campaigns in time and their actual costs per week are depicted in Figure 7.
After 365 days, the previously active campaigns were completely discarded and
a new set of campaigns was used.
The campaigns were optimized by human specialists from week 0 to week 5th
and by our algorithm from week 6th on. In addition, the cumulative daily budget
was changed at weeks 6th and 29th due to business reasons of the company, as
follows:
• 200 Euros per day from week 0th to week 5th;
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AdComb-F-TS AdComb-F-UCB AdComb-U-TS AdComb-U-UCB
RT σRT β RT σRT β RT σRT β RT σRT β
Setting 1 t = 25 73 13 89% 104 21 11% 287 24 0% 264 23 0%
t = 50 111 22 97% 169 24 3% 377 28 0% 345 30 0%
t = 100 170 37 99% 279 29 1% 485 35 0% 444 36 0%
Setting 2 t = 25 66 16 98% 125 15 2% 255 21 0% 263 21 0%
t = 50 93 21 98% 155 18 2% 327 26 0% 340 24 0%
t = 100 132 31 92% 194 22 8% 415 28 0% 424 30 0%
Setting 3 t = 25 75 15 100% 132 18 0% 319 31 0% 316 30 0%
t = 50 103 21 100% 182 20 0% 421 37 0% 397 32 0%
t = 100 145 32 100% 261 24 0% 533 42 0% 488 40 0%
Setting 4 t = 25 67 15 100% 130 29 0% 334 27 0% 306 26 0%
t = 50 103 19 100% 196 38 0% 414 31 0% 395 29 0%
t = 100 164 29 100% 297 55 0% 512 38 0% 499 35 0%
Setting 5 t = 25 112 18 27% 99 12 73% 345 30 0% 321 25 0%
t = 50 157 22 83% 180 13 17% 479 39 0% 457 30 0%
t = 100 222 24 100% 331 14 0% 648 62 0% 627 36 0%
Setting 6 t = 25 100 15 93% 99 9 7% 272 20 0% 287 24 0%
t = 50 140 19 100% 180 13 0% 370 32 0% 391 28 0%
t = 100 221 32 100% 331 20 0% 480 37 0% 507 34 0%
Setting 7 t = 25 100 15 98% 142 14 2% 336 24 0% 344 28 0%
t = 50 145 19 94% 184 13 6% 453 34 0% 456 33 0%
t = 100 220 30 83% 250 14 17% 595 43 0% 587 37 0%
Setting 8 t = 25 90 14 98% 144 22 2% 296 30 0% 278 24 0%
t = 50 128 17 99% 220 21 1% 386 30 0% 363 28 0%
t = 100 181 20 100% 303 27 0% 495 35 0% 466 34 0%
Setting 9 t = 25 89 17 90% 127 21 10% 334 23 0% 329 26 0%
t = 50 119 23 91% 162 24 9% 417 28 0% 421 34 0%
t = 100 165 33 88% 224 32 12% 510 36 0% 519 40 0%
Setting 10 t = 25 91 20 100% 197 10 7% 331 25 0% 302 29 0%
t = 50 138 23 100% 248 16 0% 424 31 0% 402 39 0%
t = 100 214 35 100% 333 22 0% 537 38 0% 518 44 0%
Table 3: Results for Experiment #3: performance of algorithms AdComb-F-TS, AdComb-
F-UCB, AdComb-U-TS, AdComb-U-UCB with 10 different random settings at round t ∈
{25, 50, 100}.
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• 1, 100 Euros per day from week 6th to week 28th (the increase in the daily
budget was motivated to obtain more leads);
• 700 Euros per day from week 29th on (the decrease in the daily budget
was motivated to reduce the cost per lead).
The algorithm was implemented in Python 2.7.12 and executed on Ubuntu
16.04.1 LTS with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v3 2.40GHz. We used a
discretization of the bid and daily budget space such that |X| = 100 and |Y | =
500. Furthermore, the estimates are based on the data collected in the last 20
weeks, thus using a sliding window of 140 days, to discard observations that were
considered excessively old by human specialists. The algorithm ran at midnight,
collecting the observations of the day before, updating the models, computing
the next values bid/daily budget to use, and, finally, setting these values on
the corresponding platforms. The total computing time of the algorithm per
execution was shorter than 5 minutes.
The cost per lead and the actual costs per week are reported in Figures 8
and 9, respectively. The cost per lead dramatically reduced thanks to the ac-
tivation of algorithm at the 6th week, from an average of about 120 Euros per
lead to about 65 Euros per lead. Furthermore, the algorithm spent about 4
weeks to reduce the cost per lead from about 65 Euros (at the 6th week) to
about 50 Euros (at the 10th week). The algorithm exhibited a rather explo-
rative behavior until the 15th week due to the need to collect samples, whereas,
from the 16th week to the 26th week, the algorithm presented a rather stable
behavior. Notably, even if the algorithm was rather explorative up to the 15th
week, the performance in these weeks was evaluated rather stable by the human
specialists. The oscillations from the 15th week to the 28th week were due to
seasonability effects and the campaigns of the competitors. More precisely, the
human specialists confirmed that from the 12th week (beginning of September,
corresponding to the conclusion of the summer holidays in Italy) to the 18th
week (middle of October), the users are usually less interested to make loans.
This behavior leaded to an increase of the cost per lead. A similar effect was
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Figure 7: Actual costs for the campaigns. A cost of 0 Euros means that the campaign is not
active.
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observed from the 22th week to the 27th week (corresponding to the period from
the beginning of December to the middle of January). At the 29th week, the
reduction of the daily budget pushed the algorithms to explore better the val-
ues of the functions to learn for smaller values of the daily budget. This task
required 4 weeks, in which the cost per lead reduced from about 65 Euros to
about 35 Euros.
The actual cost per week, differently from the cost per lead, was subject
to prominent oscillations. These oscillations were due to seasonability and the
possibility of overspending on the platform (i.e., even if the platforms allow
the introduction of daily budget constraints, these constraints can be violated
by the platforms). The evaluation of the performance of our algorithm was
very positive for the company, as to motivate its adoption for other sets of
campaigns.
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6. Conclusions and Future Works
In the current paper, we present the AdComB algorithm, a method capable
of choosing automatically the values of the bid and the daily budget of a set
of Internet advertising campaigns to maximize, in an online fashion, the rev-
enue under a budget constraint. The algorithm exploits Gaussian Processes to
estimate the campaigns performance, combinatorial bandit techniques to ad-
dress the exploration/exploitation dilemma in the bid/daily budget choice, and
dynamic programming techniques to solve the allocation optimization prob-
lem. We propose four flavors of our algorithms: AdComB-U-UCB which uses an
unfactorized model for the bid/daily budget space and confidence bounds for
exploration, AdComB-U-TS which uses an unfactorized model and sampling as
exploration strategy, AdComB-F-UCB which uses a factorized model and upper
confidence bounds, and AdComB-F-TS which uses a factorized model and sam-
pling for exploration. We theoretically analyze our algorithms and we provide
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high probability bounds on the regret of O˜(√T ), where T is the time horizon of
the learning process. Our experimental results, on both synthetic settings and
real-world settings, show that our algorithms tackle the problem properly, out-
performing other naive algorithms based on existing solutions and the human
expert, respectively.
As future work, we plan to study an algorithm for the adaptive discretization
of the bid and budget space, depending on the complexity of the setting and
the time horizon T . Furthermore, while in the present work we assume that the
environment, including the users and the other advertisers, is stationary over
time, we will investigate non-stationary environments, e.g., including in the
model the seasonality over different time scales of the user behaviour, as well as
sudden changes due the modification of the competitors marketing policy.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 1 (From [36]). Given the realization of a GP f(·), the estimates of the
mean µˆt−1(x) and variance σˆ2t−1(x) for the input x belonging to the input space
X, for each b ∈ R+ the following condition holds:
P
(
|f(x)− µˆt−1(x)| ≥
√
b σˆt−1(x)
)
≤ e− b2 ,
for each x ∈ X.
Proof. Be r ∼ N (0, 1) and c ∈ R+, we have:
P[r > c] =
1√
2pi
e−
c2
2
∫ ∞
c
e−
(r−c)2
2 −c(r−c) dr ≤ e− c
2
2 P[r > 0] =
1
2
e−
c2
2 ,
since e−c(r−c) ≤ 1 for r ≥ c. For the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution, we
have:
P[|r| > c] ≤ e− c
2
2 .
Applying the above result to r = f(x)−µˆt−1(x)σˆt−1(x) and c =
√
b concludes the proof.
Theorem 1. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nj(x, y) is the realization of a GP. Using the AdComb-U-UCB algorithm
with the following upper bounds for the number of clicks and of value per click:
uˆ
(n)
j,t−1(x, y) := µˆj,t−1(x, y) +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(x, y),
uˆ
(v)
j,t−1 := νˆj,t−1 +
√
b′t ψˆ
2
j,t−1,
respectively, with bt := 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
3δ
)
and b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
3δ
)
. For every
δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
√√√√√8TNbT
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
) N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + ξ(nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
),
where, λ and ξ are variances of the measurement noise of the click functions
nj(·) and of the value per click vj, respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the
maximum expected value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is
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the maximum expected number of click we might obtain on average over all the
campaigns Cj, and σ
2 := k(a,a) ≥ σˆ2j,t(a) for each j, t and a. Equivalently,
with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
 ,
where the notation O˜(·) disregards the logarithmic factors.
Proof. In AdComb-U-UCB, we assume the number of clicks nj(x, y) = nj(a) of
a campaign Cj be the realization of a GP over the space D of the bid/daily
budget pairs a = (x, y). Using the selected input aj,h and the corresponding
observations n˜j,h = n˜j,h(aj,h) for each h ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}, the GP provides the
estimates of the mean µˆj,t−1(a) and variance σˆ2j,t−1(a) for each a ∈ D. The
sampling phase is based on the upper bounds on the number of clicks and on
the value per click, formally:
u
(n)
j,t−1(a) := µˆj,t−1(a) +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(a), (A.1)
u
(v)
j.t−1 := νˆj,t−1 +
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1. (A.2)
Applying Lemma 1 to Equation (A.1) for a generic arm a and b = bt we
have:
P
[
|nj(a)− µj,t−1(a)| >
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ e− bt2 .
In the execution of the AdComb-U-UCB algorithm, after t − 1 rounds, each
arm can be chosen a number of times from 0 to t − 1. Applying the union
bound over the rounds (t ∈ {1, . . . , T}), the campaigns (j ∈ {1, . . . , N}) and
the available arms in each campaign D (a ∈ D), and exploiting Lemma (1), we
obtain:
P
 ⋃
t∈{1,...,T}
⋃
j∈{1,...,N}
⋃
a∈D
(
|nj(a)− µˆj,t−1(a)| >
√
bt σˆj,t−1(a)
)
≤
T∑
t=1
N∑
j=1
Me−
bt
2 .
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Thus, choosing bt = 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
3δ
)
, we obtain:
T∑
t=1
N∑
j=1
Me−
bt
2 =
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
M
3δ
pi2NMt2
≤ δ
2
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
6
pi2
∞∑
t=1
1
t2
)
=
δ
2
.
Similarly, using Lemma 1, we have:
P
[
|vj − νˆj,t−1| >
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1
]
≤ e− b
′
t
2 ,
which holds for each j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Choosing b′t = 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
3δ
)
and applying
an union bound we have:
P
 ⋃
t∈{1,...,T}
⋃
j∈{1,...,N}
(
|vj − νˆj,t−1| >
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1
)
≤
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
e−
bt
2 =
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
3δ
pi2Nt2
≤ δ
2
.
Therefore, the event that at least one of the upper bounds over the number of
clicks and the value per click does not hold has probability less than δ.
Assume to be in the event that all the previous bounds hold. The instanta-
neous pseudo-regret regt at round t satisfies the following inequality:
regt = r
∗
µ − rµ(St) ≤ r∗µ − rµ¯t(St) + rµ¯t(St)− rµ(St),
where µ¯t := (u
(v)
1,t−1u
(n)
1,t−1(a1), . . . , u
(v)
N,t−1u
(n)
N,t−1(aM )) is the vector composed
of all the upper bounds of the different arms (of dimension NM). Let us recall
that, given a generic superarm S, if all the elements of a vector µ are larger
than the ones of µ′ the following holds:
rµ(S) ≥ rµ′(S).
Let us focus on the term rµ¯t(St). The following inequality holds:
rµ¯t(St) ≥ r∗µ¯t ≥ rµ¯t(S∗µ) ≥ rµ(S∗µ) = r∗µ, (A.3)
where S∗µ ∈ arg maxS∈S(rµ(S)) is the super-arm providing the optimum ex-
pected reward when the expected rewards are µ. Thus, we have:
regt ≤ rµ¯t(St)− rµ(St)
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≤ rµ¯t(St)− rµt(St) + rµt(St)− rµ(St),
where µt := (ηˆ1,t−1µˆ1,t−1(a1), . . . , ηˆN,t−1µˆN,t−1(aM )) is the vector composed of
the estimated average payoffs for each arm a ∈ D.
A bound the terms (rµ¯t(St) − rµt(St)) is provided by the definition of the
upper confidence bounds:
rµ¯t(St)− rµt(St) =
N∑
j=1
[
u
(v)
j,t−1u
(n)
j,t−1(aj,t)− νˆj,t−1µˆj,t−1(aj,t)
]
=
N∑
j=1
[
νˆj,t−1
√
bt σˆj,t−1(aj,t) + µˆj,t−1(aj,t)
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1 +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(aj,t)
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1
]
≤
N∑
j=1
{[
vj +
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1
]√
bt σˆj,t−1(aj,t)
+
[
nj(aj,t) +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(aj,t)
]√
b′t ψˆj,t−1 +
√
bt σˆj,t−1(aj,t)
√
b′t φˆj,t−1
}
≤
N∑
j=1
[
vmax
√
bt max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + nmax
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1 + 3
√
btb′t ψˆj,t−1 max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + nmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 + 3
√
btb′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a)
≤ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + (nmax
√
bt + 3
√
btb′tσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1,
where aj,t is the arm chosen for campaign Cj in the superarm St, vmax :=
maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected value per click, nmax := maxj,a nj(a)
is the maximum expected number of clicks for any campaign. In the above
derivation we used that σ2j,t(a) ≤ k(a,a) =: σ2 for each j, t and a.
Let us focus on the term (rµt(St)− rµ(St)):
rµt(St)− rµ(St) =
N∑
j=1
[νˆj,t−1µˆj,t−1(aj,t)− vjnj(aj,t)]
=
N∑
j=1
[νˆj,t−1µˆj,t−1(aj,t)− νˆj,t−1nj(aj,t) + νˆj,t−1nj(aj,t)− vjnj(aj,t)]
≤
N∑
j=1
[
(vj +
√
b′t ψˆj,t−1)(µˆj,t−1(aj,t)− nj(aj,t)) + nj(aj,t)(νˆj,t−1 − vj)
]
≤
N∑
j=1
(vmax +
√
b′tψˆj,t−1)
√
bt max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + nmax
√
b′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
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≤ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + (nmax
√
bt +
√
btb′tσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1,
where we used arguments similar to the ones considered in the previous deriva-
tion.
Overall, summing up the two terms, we have:
regt ≤ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + (nmax
√
bt + 3
√
btb′tσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
+ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + (nmax
√
bt +
√
btb′tσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
= 2
√
bt
vmax N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) + (nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
 .
We need now to upper bound σˆi,t−1(a) and ψˆj,t−1. Recall that, thanks to
Lemma 5.3 in [36], under the Gaussian assumption we can express the informa-
tion gain provided by the observations nt−1 = (n˜j,1, . . . , n˜j,t−1) corresponding
to the sequence of arms (aj,1, . . . ,aj,t−1) as:
IG(nt−1 |nj) = 1
2
t−1∑
h=1
log
(
1 +
σˆ2j,h(aj,h)
λ
)
.
Since bh is non-decreasing in h, we can write:
σ2j,h(aj,h) = λ
[
σˆ2j,h(aj,h)
λ
]
≤
log
(
1 +
σˆ2j,h(aj,h)
λ
)
log
(
1 + 1λ
) , (A.4)
since s2 ≤ log (1+s2)
λ log(1+ 1λ )
for all s ∈ [0, 1λ ], and
σˆ2j,h(aj,h)
λ ≤ k(aj,h,aj,h)λ ≤ 1λ .
Using the definition of ψˆj,t−1 we have:
t−1∑
h=1
ψˆ2j,t−1 =
t−1∑
h=1
ψ2j ξ
ξ + (h− 1)ψ2j
≤ ξ log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ t
)
.
Since Equation (A.4) holds for any a ∈ D, then it also holds for the arm
amax maximizing the variance σ
2
j,h(aj,h) in nj defined over D. Thus, using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain:
R2T (U) ≤ T
T∑
t=1
reg2t
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≤ 4TbT
T∑
t=1
2v2max
 N∑
j=1
max
a∈Dj
σj,t−1(a)
2 + 2(nmax + 2√b′tσ)2
 N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
2

≤ 8TbT
{
T∑
t=1
v2maxN N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆ2j,t−1(a)
+ T∑
t=1
(nmax + 2√b′tσ)2N N∑
j=1
ψˆ2j,t−1
}
≤ 8TNbT
{
v2max
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
max
a∈D
log
(
1 +
σˆ2i,n−1(a)
λ
)
log
(
1 + 1λ
)

+ (nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)
2
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ψˆ2j,t−1
}
≤ 8TNbT
{
v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
) N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
max
a∈D
log
(
1 +
σˆ2i,n−1(a)
λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=γT (nj)
+ ξ(nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)
2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}
≤ 8TNbT
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
) N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + ξ(nmax + 2
√
b′tσ)
2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
) .
We conclude the proof by taking the square root on both the r.h.s. and the
l.h.s. of the last inequality.
Theorem 2. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nj(x, y) is the realization of a GP. Using the AdComb-U-TS algorithm, for
every δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
{
8TN
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
)bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
+ξb′T (nmax +
√
bTσ)
2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where bt := 8 log
(
2NMt2
3δ
)
, b′t := 8 log
(
2Nt2
3δ
)
, λ and ξ are variances of the
measurement noise of the click functions nj(·) and of the value per click vj,
respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected value per click,
nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is the maximum expected number of click
50
we might obtain on average over all the campaigns Cj, and σ
2 := k(a,a) ≥
σˆ2j,t(a) for each j, t and a.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
γT (nj)
 .
Proof. Recall that in AdComb-2D-TS we assume the number of clicks nj(x, y) =
nj(a) of a campaign Cj is the realization of a GP over the space D of the
bid/budget pairs a = (x, y). Using the selected input aj,h and corresponding
observations n˜j,h = n˜j,h(aj,h) for each h ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} the GP provides us
with the estimates of the mean µˆj,t−1(a) and variance σˆ2j,t−1(a) for each a ∈ D.
The sampling phase generates the following two values for the number of clicks
and on the value per click, formally, for each campaign Cj , a sample θ
(n)
j,t−1(a)
is extracted from N (µˆj,t−1(a), σˆ2j,t−1(a)) for the number of clicks, and a sample
θ
(v)
j,t−1 is extracted from N (νˆj,t−1, ψˆj,t−1).
Let us focus on θ
(n)
j,t−1(a). Since Lemma 1 also applies to univariate Gaussian
distributions, it holds for θ
(n)
j,t−1(a), for a generic arm a, and, formally, we have:
P
[
|θ(n)j,t−1(a)− µˆj,t−1(a)| >
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ e− bt2 ,
for each bt > 0. By relying on the triangle inequality, fora each a ∈ D we have:
P
[
|θ(n)j,t−1(a)− nj(a)| >
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ P
[
|θ(n)j,t−1(a)− µˆj,t−1(a)|+ |µˆj,t−1(a)− nj(a)| >
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ P
[
|θ(n)j,t−1(a)− µˆj,t−1(a)| >
1
2
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
+ P
[
|µˆj,t−1(a)− nj(a)| > 1
2
√
btσˆj,t−1(a)
]
≤ 2e− bt8 .
Similarly to what done in the proof of Theorem 1, setting bt := 8 log
(
2NMt2
3δ
)
,
applying the union bound over the rounds, the subsets D, the number of times
the arms are chosen in D, and the available arms, we have that the following
holds with probability at least 1− δ2 :
|θ(n)j,h−1(a)− nj(a)| <
√
bhσˆj,h−1(a),
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for all a ∈ Dj , j ∈ {1, . . . N} and h ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
The same reasoning can be carried out with θ
(v)
j,t−1 setting b
′
t := 8 log
(
2Nt2
3δ
)
,
so that the following bound:
|θ(v)j,t−1 − vj | <
√
b′tψˆj,t−1,
holds for each j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and h ∈ {1, . . . , t} with probability at least 1− δ2 .
Therefore, jointly, the bounds over the number of clicks and on the value per
click hold with probability at least 1− δ.
Let us assume that all previous bounds hold. Consider the instantaneous
pseudo-regret regt at round t:
regt = r
∗
µ − rµ(St)
= r∗µ − rθt(S∗µ) + rθt(S∗µ)− rθt(St) + rθt(St)− rµ(St)
≤ |rµ(S∗µ)− rθt(S∗µ)|+ |rθt(St)− rµ(St)|,
where θt := (θ
(v)
1,t−1θ
(n)
1,t−1(a1), . . . , θ
(v)
N,t−1θ
(n)
N,t−1(aM )) is the vector of the drawn
payoffs for the turn t and rθt(S
∗
µ)− rθt(St) ≤ 0 for the fact that the chosen arm
St maximize the reward assuming an expected reward over the arms of θt.
Let us focus on the term |rµ(S) − rθt(S)| on a generic superarm S =
(a1, . . .aN ):
|rµ(S)− rθt(S)| =
N∑
j=1
|vjnj(aj)− θ(v)j,t−1θ(n)j,t−1(aj)|
=
N∑
j=1
|vjnj(aj)− θ(v)j,t−1nj(aj)|+ |θ(v)j,t−1nj(aj)− θ(v)j,t−1θ(n)j,t−1(aj)|
=
N∑
j=1
[
nmax
√
b′tψˆj,t−1 + θ
(v)
j,t−1
√
btσˆj,t−1(aj)
]
= nmax
√
b′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 +
N∑
j=1
(
vj +
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
)√
btσˆj,t−1(aj)
= nmax
√
b′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 + vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(aj) +
√
btb′tσ
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
≤ vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆj,t−1(a) +
√
b′t(nmax +
√
btσ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1,
52
and, therefore, the instantaneous regret regt is bounded by twice the quantity
we derived.
The cumulative regret becomes:
R2T (U) ≤ T
T∑
t=1
reg2t
≤ 4T
T∑
t=1
2v2maxbt
 N∑
j=1
max
a∈Dj
σj,t−1(a)
2 + 2b′t(nmax +√btσ)2
 N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
2

≤ 8T
{
bT
T∑
t=1
v2maxN N∑
j=1
max
a∈D
σˆ2j,t−1(a)
+ b′T T∑
t=1
(nmax +√btσ)2N N∑
j=1
ψˆ2j,t−1
}
≤ 8TN
 v2max
log
(
1 + 1λ
)bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + ξb
′
T (nmax +
√
bTσ)
2
N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
) .
We conclude the proof by taking the square root on both the r.h.s. and the
l.h.s. of the last inequality.
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Theorem 3. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) are the realization of GPs. Using the AdComb-F-UCB
algorithm with the following upper bounds for the number of clicks, the number
of clicks per unit of budget, and the value per click, respectively:
u
(n)
j,t−1(x) := µˆj,t−1(x) +
√
btσˆj,t−1(x),
u
(e)
j,t−1(x) := ηˆj,t−1(x) +
√
btsˆj,t−1(x),
u
(v)
j,t−1 := ˆνj,t−1 +
√
b′tψˆj,t−1,
with bt = 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
2δ
)
and b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
2δ
)
. For every δ ∈ (0, 1), the
following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
{
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where c¯1 :=
12v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
12v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
, and c¯3 := 12ξ, ξ, λ and λ
′ are the
variance of the value per click, measurement noise on the maximum number
of clicks and number of clicks per unit of daily budget, respectively, vmax :=
maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y)
is the maximum expected number of click we might obtain on average over all
the campaigns Cj, ymax := maxy∈Y y is the maximum budget one can allocate
on a campaign, and σ2 := k(x, x) ≥ σˆ2j,t(x), s2 := k′(x, x) ≥ sˆ2j,t(x) for each j,
t and x.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
[γT (nj) + γT (ej)]
 .
Proof. At first notice that Lemma 1 can be applied to the quantities of maximum
number of clicks, maximum cost and value per click. This allows, setting bt :=
2 log
(
pi2NMt2
2δ
)
and b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
2δ
)
, that the following bounds for each arm
x and each round t hold at the same time:
|nsatj (x)− µˆj,t−1(x)| ≤
√
btσˆj,t−1(x),
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|esatj (x)− ηˆj,t−1(x)| ≤
√
btsˆj,t−1(x),
|vj − νˆj,t−1| ≤
√
b′tψˆj,t−1,
with probability at least 1 − δ, since each one of the above events holds with
probability at least 1− δ3 .
Assume that the previous bounds hold and consider the following quantity:∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ . (A.5)
If we are able to provide a bound for this quantity, then following the proof of
Theorem 1 it is possible to provide a bound on the regret of the AdComb-F-UCB
algorithm.
Depending on the values of y, esatj (x) and ηˆj,t−1(x) we can distinguish the
following 4 cases:
Case 1: if ycsatj (x) > n
sat
j (x) ∧ yηˆj,t−1(x) > µˆj,t−1(x) the quantity in Equa-
tion A.5 becomes:∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ (A.6)
≤ |nsatj (x)− µˆj,t−1(x)| ≤
√
btσˆj,t−1(x). (A.7)
Case 2 ycsatj (x) < n
sat
j (x)∧ yηˆj,t−1(x) < µˆj,t−1(x) the quantity in Equation A.5
becomes: ∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ (A.8)
= y
∣∣esatj (x)− ηˆj,t−1(x)∣∣ ≤ ymax√btsˆj,t−1(x). (A.9)
Case 3:
nsatj (x)
esatj (x)
< y <
µˆj,t−1(x)
ηˆj,t−1(x)
the quantity in Equation A.5 becomes:
∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ (A.10)
=
∣∣nsatj (x)− yηˆj,t−1(x)∣∣ (A.11)
≤ y ∣∣esatj (x)− ηˆj,t−1(x)∣∣ ≤ ymax√btsˆj,t−1(x), (A.12)
where we used that nsatj (x) ≤ yesatj (x).
Case 4:
µˆj,t−1(x)
ηˆj,t−1(x)
< y <
nsatj (x)
esatj (x)
the quantity in Equation A.5 becomes:
∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ (A.13)
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=
∣∣yesatj (x)− µˆj,t−1(x)∣∣ (A.14)
≤ |nsatj (x)− µˆj,t−1(x)| ≤
√
btσˆj,t−1(x), (A.15)
where we used that nsatj (x) ≥ yesatj (x).
Overall we have that:
∣∣min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣ (A.16)
≤
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x)) . (A.17)
Similarly to what has been provided above, let us focus on the quantity:∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ , (A.18)
which can be bounded by looking at the same 4 different cases.
Case 1: if yu
(e)
j,t−1(x) > u
(n)
j,t−1(x) ∧ yηˆj,t−1(x) > µˆj,t−1(x) the quantity in
Equation A.18 becomes by definition:∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ (A.19)
= |u(n)j,t−1(x)− µˆj,t−1(x)| =
√
btσˆj,t−1(x). (A.20)
Case 2 yu
(e)
j,t−1(x) < u
(n)
j,t−1(x) ∧ yηˆj,t−1(x) < µˆj,t−1(x) the quantity in Equa-
tion A.18 becomes:∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆj,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ (A.21)
= y
∣∣∣u(e)j,t−1(x)− ηˆ1,t−1(x)∣∣∣ (A.22)
≤ ymax
√
btsˆj,t−1(x). (A.23)
Case 3:
u
(n)
j,t−1(x)
u
(e)
j,t−1(x)
< y <
µˆj,t−1(x)
ηˆj,t−1(x)
the quantity in Equation A.18 becomes:
∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ (A.24)
=
∣∣∣u(n)j,t−1(x)− yηˆj,t−1(x)∣∣∣ (A.25)
≤ y
∣∣∣u(e)j,t−1(x)− ηˆj,t−1(x)∣∣∣ (A.26)
≤ ymax
√
btsˆj,t−1(x). (A.27)
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Case 4:
µˆj,t−1(x)
ηˆj,t−1(x)
< y <
u
(n)
j,t−1(x)
u
(e)
j,t−1(x)
the quantity in Equation A.18 becomes:
∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ (A.28)
=
∣∣∣yu(e)j,t−1(x)− µˆj,t−1(x)∣∣∣ (A.29)
≤
∣∣∣u(n)j,t−1(x)− µˆj,t−1(x)∣∣∣ = √btσˆj,t−1(x). (A.30)
Overall we have the bound:∣∣∣min{u(n)j,t−1(x), yu(e)j,t−1(x)}−min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)}∣∣∣ (A.31)
≤
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x)) . (A.32)
Since the definition of per round regret regt is the same as the one in The-
orem 1, defining:
µ¯t :=
(
u
(v)
1,t−1 min
{
u
(n)
1,t−1(x1), y1u
(e)
1,t−1(x1)
}
, . . . ,
u
(v)
N,t−1 min
{
u
(n)
N,t−1(xM ), yMu
(e)
N,t−1(xM )
})
,
µt :=
(
νˆ1,t−1 min {µˆ1,t−1(x1), y1ηˆ1,t−1(x1)} , . . . ,
νˆN,t−1 min {µˆN,t−1(xM ), yM ηˆN,t−1(xM )}
)
µ :=
(
v1 min
{
nsat1 (x1), y1c
sat
1 (x1)
}
, . . . ,
vN min
{
nsatN (xM ), yMc
sat
N (xM )
})
,
we have:
regt ≤ rµ¯t(St)− rµ(St)
≤ rµ¯t(St)− rµt(St) + rµt(St)− rµ(St),
A bound the terms (rµ¯t(St) − rµt(St)) is provided by the definition of the
upper confidence bounds:
rµ¯t(St)− rµt(St)
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=N∑
j=1
[
u
(v)
j,t−1 min
{
u
(n)
j,t−1(xj,t), yj,tu
(e)
j,t−1(xj,t)
}
− νˆj,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)}
]
=
N∑
j=1
[
u
(v)
j,t−1 min
{
u
(n)
j,t−1(xj,t), yj,tu
(e)
j,t−1(xj,t)
}
− u(v)j,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)}
+u
(v)
j,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)} − νˆj,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)}
]
≤
N∑
j=1
{[
vmax + 2
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
] (
min
{
u
(n)
j,t−1(xj,t), yj,tu
(e)
j,t−1(xj,t)
}
−min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)}
)
+ (u
(v)
j,t−1 − νˆj,t−1)
[
nsatmax +
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x))
]}
≤
N∑
j=1
{[
vmax + 2
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
]√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x))
+
(
nsatmax +
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x))
)√
b′tψˆj,t−1
}
= vmax ymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x) + vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x) + 2
√
btb′t(symax + σ)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
+ nsatmax
√
b′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 + symax
√
btb′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1 + σ
√
btb′t
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
= vmax ymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x) + vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x) +
(
3symax
√
btb′t
+ nsatmax
√
b′t + 3σ
√
btb′t
) N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1,
where vmax := max
N
j=1 vj is the maximum expected value per click, nmax :=
maxj,x nj(x) is the maximum number of clicks for any campaign, and we have
σˆj,t(x) ≤ σ and sˆj,t(x) ≤ s for each j, t, and x.
Let us focus on the term (rµt(St)− rµ(St)):
rµt(St)− rµ(St)
=
N∑
j=1
[
νˆj,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)} − vj min
{
nsatj (xj,t), yj,te
sat
j (xj,t)
}]
=
N∑
j=1
[
νˆj,t−1 min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)} − νˆj,t−1 min
{
nsatj (xj,t), yj,te
sat
j (xj,t)
}
+νˆj,t−1 min
{
nsatj (xj,t), yj,te
sat
j (xj,t)
}− vj min{nsatj (xj,t), yj,tesatj (xj,t)}]
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≤
N∑
j=1
{[
vmax +
√
btψˆj,t−1
] (
min {µˆj,t−1(xj,t), yj,tηˆj,t−1(xj,t)}
−min{nsatj (xj,t), yj,tesatj (xj,t)})+ (νˆj,t−1 − vj,t−1)nsatmax}
≤
N∑
j=1
{[
vmax +
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
]√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x)) + nsatmax
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
}
= vmax ymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x) + vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x)
+ (
√
btb′tσ + symax
√
btb′t + n
sat
max
√
b′t)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
where we used arguments similar to the ones we considered in the previous
derivation.
Summing up we have:
regt ≤ 2vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x) + 2vmax ymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x)
+
√
b′t
(
4symax
√
bt + 4σ
√
bt + 2n
sat
max
) N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1,
Using arguments similar to what has been used in Theorem 1 we have:
R2T (U) ≤ T
T∑
t=1
reg2t
= T
T∑
t=1
2vmax√bt N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x) + 2vmax ymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x)
+
√
b′t
(
4symax
√
bt + 4σ
√
Bt + 2n
sat
max
) N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1
2
≤ T
12v2maxbTN N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
max
x
σˆ2j,t−1(x) + 12v
2
max y
2
maxbTN
N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
max
x
sˆ2j,t−1(x)
+3b′TN
(
4symax
√
bT + 4σ
√
bT + 2n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ψˆ2j,t−1
2
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
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+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
) ,
where we defined c¯1 :=
12v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
12v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
, and c¯3 := 12ξ, where λ and
λ′ are the variance of the measurement noise on the maximum number of clicks
and number of clicks per unit of daily budget. Taking the square root of both
right and left hand side of this inequality concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. Let us consider an ABBA problem over T rounds where the func-
tions nsatj (x) and e
sat
j (x) are the realization of GPs. Using the AdComb-F-TS
algorithm, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
RT (U) ≤
{
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
)}1/2,
where bt = 2 log
(
pi2NMt2
2δ
)
, b′t := 2 log
(
pi2Nt2
2δ
)
, c¯1 :=
48v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
48v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
,
and c¯3 := 12ξ, ξ, λ and λ
′ are the variance of the value per click, measure-
ment noise on the maximum number of clicks and number of clicks per unit of
daily budget, respectively, vmax := maxj∈{1,...,N} vj is the maximum expected
value per click, nmax := maxx∈X,y∈Y,j∈{1,...,N} nj(x, y) is the maximum ex-
pected number of click we might obtain on average over all the campaigns Cj,
ymax := maxy∈Y y is the maximum budget one can allocate on a campaign, and
σ2 := k(x, x) ≥ σˆ2j,t(x), s2 := k′(x, x) ≥ sˆ2j,t(x) for each j, t and x.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− δ, it holds:
RT (U) = O˜
√√√√TN N∑
j=1
[γT (nj) + γT (ej)]
 .
Proof. We recall that the decision we take are based on samples drawn from
these distributions:
θ
(n)
j,t−1(x) ∼ N (µˆj,t−1(x), σˆ2j,t−1(x)),
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θ
(e)
j,t−1(x) ∼ N (ηˆj,t−1(x), sˆ2j,t−1(x)),
θ
(v)
j,t−1 ∼ N (νˆj,t−1, ψˆ2j,t−1).
Ad we derived in the proof of Theorem 2, by extracting samples from the
predictive distributions of the GP we have that:
P
[
|θ(n)j,t (x)− nsatj (x)| >
√
btσˆj,t−1(x)
]
≤ 2e− bt8 ,
P
[
|θ(e)j,t (x)− esatj (x)| >
√
btsˆj,t−1(x)
]
≤ 2e− bt8 ,
P
[
|θ(v)j,t − vj | >
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
]
≤ 2e− b
′
t
8 ,
and, therefore, setting bt := 8 log
(
2NMt2
2δ
)
and b′t := 8 log
(
2Nt2
2δ
)
we have that
the bounds over the rounds t, the different GPs j and the different arms x holds
together with probability greater than 1− δ.
Using arguments similar to what has been used in Theorem 3, we obtain the
following bound for a generic bid/budget pair (x, y):
|min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)} −min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)}|
≤ |min{nsatj (x), yesatj (x)} −min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)} |
+ |min {µˆj,t−1(x), yηˆ1,t−1(x)} −min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)}|
≤ 2
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x)) .
As in Theorem 2, the instantaneous pseudo-regret regt at round t is bounded
as follows:
regt ≤ |rµ(S∗µ)− rθt(S∗µ)|+ |rθt(St)− rµ(St)|,
where µ us defined as in Theorem 3 and
θt := (θ
(v)
1,t min{θ(n)1,t (x1),y1θ(e)1,t (x1)}, . . . ,
θ
(v)
N,t min{θ(n)N,t(xM ), yMθ(e)1,t (xM )}
is the vector of the drawn payoffs for the turn t and rθt(S
∗
µ)−rθt(St) ≤ 0 for the
fact that the chosen arm St maximize the reward assuming an expected reward
over the arms of θt.
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Let us focus on bounding the quantity |rµ(S)−rθt(S)| on a generic superarm
S:
|rµ(S)− rθt(S)| =
=
N∑
j=1
[
vj min{nsatj (xj), yjesatj (xj)} − θ(v)j,t min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)}
]
=
N∑
j=1
[
vj min{nsatj (xj), yjesatj (xj)} − vj min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)}
+vj min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)} − θ(v)j,t min{θ(n)j,t (xj), yjθ(e)j,t (xj)}
]
≤
N∑
j=1
[
2vmax
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x))
+
√
b′tψˆj,t−1
(
nsatmax + 2
√
bt (ymaxsˆj,t−1(x) + σˆj,t−1(x))
)]
≤ 2vmaxymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x) + 2vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x)+
+
√
b′t(n
sat
max + 2symax
√
bt + 2σ
√
bt)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1)
Thus, the the instantaneous pseudo-regret regt at round t is bounded as
follows:
regt ≤ 4vmaxymax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
sˆj,t−1(x) + 4vmax
√
bt
N∑
j=1
σˆj,t−1(x)+
+ 2
√
b′t(n
sat
max + 2symax
√
bt + 2σ
√
bt)
N∑
j=1
ψˆj,t−1)
Defining the constants c¯1 :=
48v2max
log(1+ 1λ )
, c¯2 :=
48v2maxy
2
max
log(1+ 1λ′ )
, and c¯3 := 12ξ we
have a cumulative regret of:
R2T (U) ≤ T
T∑
t=1
reg2t
TN
c¯1bT N∑
j=1
γT (nj) + c¯2bT
N∑
j=1
γT (ej)
+c¯3b
′
T
(
2symax
√
bT + 2σ
√
bT + n
sat
max
)2 N∑
j=1
log
(
ξ
ψ2j
+ T
) ,
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and taking the square root of both the left and right hand side of the inequality
concludes the proof.
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